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Introduction 
How should we understand the duties between those who share in parenting a 
child?1 Most would agree that the duties between such parents are shaped by the 
child’s interests. For example: parents have negative duties to refrain from preventing 
each other from satisfying the child’s interests; parents also have positive duties to 
coordinate with each other to ensure that the child’s important interests are met. 
                                              
I am grateful to Jonathan Seglow, Lila Gailling, the journal’s editors and reviewers, and audiences at 
the University of Leicester and the Manchester Workshops in Political Theory for discussion and 
comments on previous versions. 
1
 For the sake of simplicity, I concentrate on the example of two adults sharing in parenting a child. 
However, nothing is implied regarding the value or normalcy of such a family form, and the argument 
applies to any number of parents in any kind of relationship who have decided to share in parenting a 
child. David Archard (Archard 2010) has helpfully distinguished between parental obligations 
(obligations to ensure that a child is parented), and parental responsibilities (obligations of parents 
towards their children). This paper leaves aside what Archard describes as parental obligations, and 
deals only indirectly with parental responsibilities towards children. The main concern is with the 
(narrow) question of what those who have decided to share in parenting owe to each other. 
Clarification of this question may help inform policy decisions on the enforcement of duties of sharing 
between parents, but such questions involve a range of further considerations which go beyond the 
scope of this paper. In this paper I therefore leave aside the policy implications to focus on clarifying 
the nature of the moral duties of shared parenting. 
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However, the duties of shared parenting are not exhausted by the interests of the 
child. Those who engage in shared parenting have duties to each other derived from 
the child’s interests, but they also have additional duties to each other as sharers in 
parenting. These additional duties are constituted by a combination of the general 
features of forming a shared intention, and by the special features of sharing an 
intention to parent a child.  
The account of duties of shared parenting presented here fits within the 
intentional account of the normative dimension of parenthood.2 The intentional 
account bases the special duties of parents (and subsequent rights in fulfilment of 
those duties) on adults’ voluntary choice to adopt the role of parent. This is part of a 
more general view that special duties can only be acquired through voluntary 
undertaking, or as a duty of compensation resulting from a harm caused to another. 
A compelling feature of the intentional account is that it elucidates widely held 
intuitions regarding the moral status of parents who have no genetic or gestational 
relationship with their children, such as adoptive parents, parents whose children are 
the result of donor eggs and sperm, and parents who use surrogates. However, the 
voluntarist account is also vulnerable to the criticism that it fails to explain the 
stringency of parental duties (Brake 2010, p.169). The intentional account appears 
                                              
2
 For important discussions of the intentional account of parenthood see (Brake 2005), (Brake 2010), 
(O’Neill 1979), and (Bayne & Kolers 2008). O’Neill argues that intending to parent is a sufficient but 
not necessary condition for the acquisition of parental duties, whilst Brake argues that intending to 
parent is necessary but not sufficient (parents must be able to fulfil the duties, and the child must be 
eligible to be parented by them). As this paper does not concern the basis on which parents acquire 
duties towards their children, I leave aside this dispute.   
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not only to allow that parents can acquire parental responsibilities voluntarily, but 
also that they can relinquish them voluntarily. The voluntariness of parental duties is 
thus seen as threatening to the interests of children. This paper extends concern for 
the apparent voluntary revocability of parental duties towards children to duties 
between parents. If duties between parents are derived from their choice to raise a 
child together, then are those duties extinguished simply when one parent chooses 
to no longer share parenting? I argue: no.    
 Whilst duties between those who share in parenting are derived from their 
intention to parent together, these duties cannot be extinguished simply if one party 
no longer intends to share parenting. Whilst duties of shared parenting are created 
from the separate intentions of individuals, they cannot be relinquished by the 
individuals separately. The stringency of the duties of shared parenting is derived 
from a combination of the moral significance of sharing an intention, and the 
distinctive properties of sharing an intention to parent a child. This paper therefore 
seeks to refute criticisms that the intentional account of parenthood leaves duties 
between parents susceptible to changes of individual intentions.  
 The paper begins in part one with a scenario to elucidate the problem of 
duties of shared parenting within the intentional account of parenthood. The 
scenario reveals the problem that the intentional account seems unable to explain 
the stringency of duties of shared parenting. The response to this problem begins in 
part two by describing the general structure of shared intentions and their moral 
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significance, drawing on the work of Bratman, Alonso, and Scanlon. Duties of shared 
parenting are derived from the importance of reliance in shared intentions. Part three 
considers an apparent invidious choice between voluntarism and strict performance 
of an agreement in the shared intention account of duties between parents. Duties of 
shared parenting are shown to be stringent, but not duties of strict performance. 
Duties of shared parenting are constituted by the distinctive combination of the 
value of reliance in shared intentions, the importance of assurance in agreements, 
the significance of autonomy is deciding one’s goals, and the entitlement to choose 
with whom one shares the intimacy of parenting. This constitutes the shared 
intention account of duties between parents.  
1. The Problem of Duties of Shared Parenting  
1.1 Locating Shared Parenting 
Consider Andy and Belle, who decide to parent Charlie together and are committed 
to sharing the burdens and pleasures of parenting. For Andy and Belle, parenting 
involves an on-going commitment to promoting the development of Charlie’s 
important interests.3 They value Charlie’s interests, and also the interests of each 
other in parenting as a team. For Andy and Belle, parenting as a team means more 
                                              
3
 This notion of an on-going commitment to promoting the development of Charlie’s important 
interests serves as a broad place-holder for a definition of parenthood. I leave aside a detailed 
defence or discussion of this conception of the normative dimension of parenthood, in order to 
include as many different substantive conceptions of parenthood as possible. This definition 
nonetheless identifies a salient feature common to a wide range of normative conceptions of 
parenthood.    
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than simply dividing the responsibilities and costs of parenting fairly. Andy and Belle 
choose to parent Charlie together because they value working with each other. They 
have a reciprocal interest in the efficiencies sharing brings to parenting, but also in 
the satisfactions of working together as parents. For example, Andy and Belle find 
sharing in attending parents’ evening at Charlie’s school valuable. They listen to the 
feedback from teachers, discuss and agree a plan in response together, and take joint 
responsibility for the decisions they take. They value the distinctive input the other 
provides, and take special satisfaction from knowing they want to approach this 
aspect of parenting jointly. They both know that the other is sufficiently capable of 
performing this parental role singly. But Andy and Belle enjoy the fact of sharing in 
this with each other. Andy and Belle therefore derive value from their individual 
parental relationship with Charlie, and also derive value from their relationship with 
each other in sharing parenting Charlie. 
However, Andy and Belle’s relationship deteriorates, and Andy moves out of 
the family home.  Andy wishes to continue parenting Charlie, but to no longer share 
in this with Belle. Belle becomes the primary care-giver, as Charlie maintains primary 
residence with Belle. Andy recognises that he has continued parental duties to 
Charlie, and makes every effort to ensure Charlie’s important interests are not 
affected detrimentally by the separation. He provides Charlie with adequate material 
and emotional support independently of Belle. Andy also recognises the increased 
burdens on Belle as primary care-giver, and provides her with compensation. This 
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compensation provides full recompense for Belle’s additional material costs, for 
example extra child-care to ensure she can continue working. Andy also provides 
additional funds in recognition of the additional non-material burdens of being the 
primary care-giver. 4  Andy and Belle therefore continue to parent Charlie, but no 
longer in a shared way: each parent Charlie separately.  
Belle also wishes to end her relationship with Andy as a couple. However, Belle 
wishes to continue shared parenting of Charlie, and not to parent Charlie separately. 
Belle accepts that Andy owes her material compensation for her extra costs as a 
single parent, but also regards Andy as under a duty to continue in shared parenting. 
For Belle, shared parenting was of value not simply in order to share costs, but 
because sharing in the responsibilities and experiences of parenting was of value in 
itself. Even though their personal relationship has broken down, Belle still values 
Andy’s contributions to important parental decisions and wishes to share 
responsibility for difficult choices. Belle adopted the role of parent on the basis that it 
would be shared, and still wishes to parent in a shared manner. Belle regards Andy as 
not only under a duty to compensate her for extra costs, but to continue to share in 
parenting. For Belle, Andy cannot unilaterally relinquish his duty to her by changing 
his mind and paying her compensation. For Andy however, deciding to share 
parenting was a voluntary choice, and so deciding not to share parenting should also 
be a voluntary choice. Given that he continues to fulfil his duties to Charlie and 
                                              
4
 This is meant to capture the notion that Andy has provided compensation for pecuniary and non-
pecuniary loss by Belle. 
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compensates Belle for her extra costs as single parent adequately, he regards himself 
as entitled to voluntarily relinquish his agreement with Belle to share parenting.  
1.2 How Many Duties and How Stringent? 
For the critic, this scenario reveals the inadequacy of the intentional view of 
parenthood. Andy regards himself as under no duty to continue shared parenting as 
his intentions have changed. He recognises he has a duty to compensate Belle for 
the losses she incurs due to his withdrawal of parenting. But these are special duties 
derived from the losses he causes Belle, and not special duties derived from his 
agreement to share parenting. Belle regards Andy as under a duty to continue 
sharing, as she committed to parenting Charlie on the understanding that Andy 
would share parenting. Belle regards Andy as not only under a duty to continue 
shared parenting, she regards him as under that duty even though he has attempted 
to provide compensation. The existence of special duties of sharing between Andy 
and Belle appears to rely solely on the presence of an intention to share in both. If 
the intention of either changes then the special duty is extinguished. If the change of 
intention causes a subsequent loss this creates a separate duty of compensation. But 
the critic of the intentional account has sympathy with Belle. When individuals agree 
to share in a task, it is natural to think that they have a claim against each other to 
fulfil their agreement to share. The claim to fulfil an agreement to share may persist 
even if one party subsequently changes their mind. This seems particularly the case if 
the sharing concerns an important or demanding task. An agreement to share 
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parenting a child seems such a task. Thus the existence of duties between sharers 
does not seem to depend solely on the continued presence of an intention to share. 
The case of Andy and Belle also seems to reveal that what matters to Belle is not 
either that Andy share parenting or he provides compensation. What matters most to 
Belle is that Andy fulfils his agreement to share parenting. Thus Belle wishes to 
stringently enforce her demand that Andy provide sharing. For the critic, the 
intentional account therefore fails to recognise that Andy has an on-going duty to 
share parenting with Belle even though his intentions have changed. It fails to 
recognise that Andy is under a stringent requirement to provide sharing, and that he 
cannot decide unilaterally whether to provide sharing or compensation instead.  
 Is the intentionalist account of special duties able to respond to these 
criticisms? When adults decide to share in parenting a child together, this creates 
duties of (at least) two different kinds.5 Firstly, there are the duties acquired when the 
role of parent is adopted.6 These are duties towards the child, derived from the 
child’s interests. Parental rights against others protect the adult in fulfilment of their 
fiduciary duties towards the child. In most cases, role based duties are derived from 
the goal or function associated with the role.7 When Andy and Belle decide to adopt 
the role of parent, both acquire responsibilities through their commitment to 
                                              
5
 The focus of this paper is to distinguish duties of parents towards their children from duties of 
shared parenting. I leave open that there are further duties on parents, for example towards society in 
virtue of society’s interest in children’s development. 
6
 For a discussion of the importance of the role of parenthood within the intentionalist account, see 
(Hannan & Vernon 2008)  
7
 For a fuller account of the role-based approach to rights, see (Hardimon 1994) 
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perform the functions and fulfil the ends of being a parent. Thus special duties of 
parents towards children are acquired when the adult chooses to fulfil the role of 
parent individually. However, there is a second kind of duty that forms between 
adults who decide to share in parenting a child together. These are the duties Andy 
and Belle owe each other as sharers, independent of the duties they owe Charlie as 
parents. Just as in the role based account of parental responsibilities, duties between 
sharers are derived from the intentions of adults. However, these responsibilities are 
not derived from the intentional adoption of the role of parent, but rather from the 
intention to perform a task in a shared manner. When Andy and Belle decide to share 
parenting of Charlie, they create duties in how they should relate to each other in the 
shared task. Importantly, by deciding to share in the parenting of Charlie, Andy and 
Belle created duties to each other in how they parent Charlie. These duties 
subsequently constrain their ability to independently rescind on their decision to 
share in parenting. By rescinding on his duty as sharer, Andy wronged Belle, even if 
he did not wrong Charlie. By focusing on intentions as the basis on which parental 
duties are acquired, the voluntarist account seems to suggest that such special duties 
may be extinguished by a change in intentions. This is not a necessary implication of 
the intentional view however.  Duties of shared parenting are constituted by the 
distinctive combination of the value of reliance in shared intentions, the importance 
of assurance in agreements, the significance of autonomy is deciding one’s goals, 
and the entitlement to choose with whom one shares the intimacy of parenting. Thus 
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the shared intention account of special duties is able to explain why sharing creates 
duties, and why sharing in parenting creates duties which are particularly stringent. 
2. Duties between Sharers  
2.1 Shared Intentions 
When individuals form an intention to share in parenting, they are making plans 
about how they will parent together in the future. The formation of a shared 
intention may be the result of an explicit promise or agreement, but neither are a 
necessary condition for the formation of shared intentions. Individuals may find that 
a shared intention emerges gradually without explicit agreement regarding the 
commitment to share. Michael Bratman points out that promises are insufficient to 
explain shared goals as they may be insincere and individuals may have no intention 
to fulfil the promise; indeed, individuals may share a goal without having made a 
promise, as in Hume’s case of two rowers in a row boat who row together though 
they have made no promise to each other to row (Bratman 1993, p.98). Bratman 
argues that shared plans are explained by a particular relationship between the 
intentional attitudes of individuals. For Bratman, intentions are important because 
they structure planning about ends. Two individuals share an intention when they 
both aim at the same outcome; when they both know that they both aim at the same 
outcome; when knowing that the other aims at the same outcome is a reason for 
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aiming at the same outcome; and when they proceed towards the same outcome in 
a coordinated manner (Bratman 1993, p.106). 
It is insufficient for an intention to be shared simply that both individuals aim at 
the same end: this would be a co-incident intention. In order for an intention to be 
shared it is necessary that both individuals take the other’s aim that they act together 
as an additional reason for them to pursue the same aim. They seek to attain that 
aim through means that are co-ordinated because of the other’s aims and means. For 
individuals to form an intention to share in parenting a child, both must come to 
know that the other wishes to raise a child together, and that the other’s aim of 
raising the child together becomes part of their own aim. In other words, I must 
intend that we parent a child together, and you must intend that we parent a child 
together. To intend to do something together with another person partly because 
the other person intends to do it together is characteristic of a shared intention.  
Forming shared intentions with someone can trigger moral responsibilities, but 
not necessarily. Shared intentions may be formed under conditions of coercion, or by 
individuals intending to share in an immoral act.  But when individuals form shared 
intentions to a parent a child in its best interests freely, duties of sharing are 
triggered between them.  
2.2 The General Structure of Shared Intentions and Interpersonal Duties of Reliance 
When Andy and Belle form a shared intention to parent Charlie together, moral 
duties are created between them. Some, such as Margaret Gilbert, have argued that 
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interpersonal duties are a necessary feature of shared intentions (Gilbert 1992; 
Gilbert 2000).  But this seems too strong a claim, as individuals can form shared 
intentions to perform immoral acts (Alonso 2009, p.446). It cannot be a necessary 
feature of a shared intention to act immorally that the intenders have a duty to 
perform the act. Others, such as Michael Bratman, have argued that interpersonal 
duties may follow from shared intentions, but are not intrinsic to them (Bratman 
1993; 1999). However, this is too weak a claim as, other than in cases of intending to 
perform an immoral act, it seems intuitive that there are strong duties between 
sharers regarding fulfilment of the shared intention. In a recent contribution to this 
debate, Facundo Alonso has argued that whilst shared intentions are not intrinsically 
normative, absent special features such as intending to act immorally, shared 
intentions generate interpersonal obligations (Alonso 2009). Shared intentions are 
not intrinsically moral, but they constitute relationships of reliance, and relationships 
of reliance are governed by interpersonal duties. But how do shared intentions 
produce relationships of reliance, and why is reliance a matter of interpersonal duty?   
Reliance is central to shared intentions in two respects. Firstly, whilst shared 
intentions may consist in beliefs about each other’s actions and intentions, reliance is 
the more fundamental and pervasive cognitive attitude. As Alonso argues, individuals 
may come to rely on each other even in the absence of clear evidence that the other 
will perform the action (Alonso 2009, p.453). I may come to rely on my friend to drive 
me to the airport as I have no other way to get there, even though I believe he is 
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unreliable and will probably not remember. Secondly, sharing intentions involves 
making decisions about the present and forming plans about the future. If I have a 
shared intention with my partner to go to the theatre together tonight, I will cancel 
things that may prevent me going, and make plans for the rest of the evening after 
the performance. If my partner cancels at the last minute, then I will have lost out on 
the things I’d cancelled, and wasted the time planning for my evening after the 
theatre. Reliance creates expectations, and failure to meet expectations may cause 
harm or incur costs on another. Thus reliance is the central cognitive attitude of 
shared intentions. Reliance is morally significant because individuals structure their 
lives around the expectations on which they come to rely.  
 Individuals may therefore form shared intentions in conditions where 
interpersonal duties do not apply, such as when coerced or when intending to act 
immorally. But absent such special circumstances, forming shared intentions creates 
relationships of reliance between individuals. Shared intentions are therefore 
constituted by a relationship which, in most circumstances, creates interpersonal 
duties between sharers. So when individuals form shared intentions to perform an 
act, they will acquire at least two kinds of duties: duties in how they perform the act; 
and duties towards the other sharers in the act. Consider the example mentioned 
above of visiting the theatre. Those who share the intention to visit the theatre have 
duties in the performance of the act, for example: duties to pay for their tickets and 
to behave appropriately in the performance. But they also have duties to each other 
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as sharers, for example: to arrive as agreed, to accompany each other during the 
evening and not leave the other alone unless agreed. The duties those who share 
intentions have in performing the act are independent of the existence of the shared 
intention. They apply to everyone who performs the act. However, the duties sharers 
have towards each other are derived directly from the existence of the shared 
intention between them. They apply less to how they carry out the act, and more to 
how they treat each other as sharers in the act. 
 Drawing on the work of Scanlon, Alonso has formulated the duties of reliance 
that follow from shared intentions as two principles: the Principle of Due Care (D*) 
and the Principle of Loss Prevention (L*). Principle D* requires one to take due care 
not to lead others to form reasonable but false assumptions (or reinforce such 
assumptions) if the other will suffer loss as a result of relying on these assumptions. 
Principle L* requires one to prevent a loss occurring if one has intentionally or 
negligently failed to take due care regarding others’ assumptions about one’s 
intentions (Alonso 2009, p.470). 8 
Shared intentions, absent special circumstances, create interpersonal duties 
between sharers because they create relationships of reliance. The intentional 
account of parenthood is therefore able to explain both how parents acquire special 
duties towards their children, and also how they acquire special duties towards 
others with whom they share parenting. By explaining the moral significance of 
                                              
8
 These principles are reformulations of Scanlon’s versions to include the broader notion of 
assumptions rather than expectations, see (Scanlon 2003, pp.239–240) 
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sharing intentions, we are able to explain the existence of duties of sharing. In the 
moral accounting of sharing an intention, there are (at least) two sets of duties: 
duties on individuals regarding actions they perform together; and duties of reliance 
towards each other as sharers. 
Returning to Andy and Belle, we can now see that in forming a shared intention 
to parent Charlie together, they acquired duties towards both Charlie and each other. 
The interpersonal duties between Andy and Belle are derived from the reliance that 
follows from sharing intentions. The shared intention account of parental duties is 
therefore able to explain the existence of duties between Andy and Belle. But is this 
account able to explain the stringency of the duties between shared parents?  
On the intentional account, the special duties of parents are acquired through 
intentionally adopting the role of parent. Just as one may intentionally adopt the role 
and acquire the duties of parents, it seems implied that one may choose to relinquish 
the role and duties of parenthood. Principle L* appears to allow for this, provided 
sufficient compensation is provided for losses incurred by withdrawing from shared 
parenting. In deciding independently to no longer share in the parenting of Charlie, 
Andy caused significant loss to Belle because she had relied on sharing parenting 
Charlie together with Andy. Few would doubt that compensation is owed by Andy 
because he failed to meet expectations he created in Belle. But the intentional 
account seems to neglect an important moral claim of Belle’s against Andy: duties of 
shared parenting cannot be relinquished unilaterally. Belle may well incur additional 
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costs of parenting due to Andy’s absence. She may have to spend more of her own 
time and money caring for Charlie, and it is clear that Andy owes Belle compensation 
for these extra costs. But Belle may also claim that Andy does not merely owe her 
compensation for the additional costs, but is under a duty to continue sharing the 
responsibilities of parenthood. For example, Belle may demand that Andy does not 
merely compensate her for the extra costs of attending a parents’ evening on her 
own, but shares in the responsibility of attending the parents’ evening. The 
intentional account of parental duties seems to permit Andy to relinquish his duties 
of shared parenting simply by providing adequate compensation for the losses to 
Belle. On the general account of duties of reliance in shared intentions presented 
above, Andy seems to have fulfilled his duties of due care and loss prevention. Yet 
Belle seems to have a legitimate claim against Andy in virtue of his duty as a sharer. 
Does this reveal the inadequacy of the shared intention account of duties between 
parents? 
3. The Stringency of Duties of Shared Parenting 
3.1 Voluntarism and Strict Performance: an Invidious Choice? 
Individuals who share intentions have interpersonal duties to prevent loss caused by 
failing to meet expectations they create in others. According to Principle L*, these are 
not duties of strict performance ( Alonso 2009, p.467; Scanlon 2003, p.240). It is 
important that duties of shared parenting are not matters of strict performance 
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because strict performance seems at odds with the voluntarist account of special 
duties. According to the voluntarist view, special duties are acquired either voluntarily 
or through causing harm to someone. The claim that duties persist, even when 
someone no longer wishes to share parenting and has provided compensation, 
appears to neglect the normative significance of voluntarism in the acquisition of 
special duties. Belle’s demand that Andy continue in shared parenting, even when he 
has compensated her for loss, seems to restrict unreasonably his freedom to form 
and relinquish special duties. Andy has taken reasonable steps to prevent loss by 
compensating Belle for his decision to no longer share in parenting Charlie (and was 
not negligent in creating the expectations as they were made in good faith). Does 
this leave Belle with no legitimate claims against Andy regarding shared parenting? 
The intentional account of duties of shared parenting seems to leave us with an 
invidious choice regarding the stringency of Belle’s claims against Andy. Either we say 
that Andy has discharged his duties to Belle by providing reasonable compensation, 
in which case we must abandon intuitions that Belle has on-going claims against 
Andy to continue sharing in parenting. But this seems to fail to account for the 
stringency of duties between those who share parenting. Or, we accept that Belle has 
legitimate claims against Andy to continue sharing in parenting, in which case we 
must regard agreements between sharers as creating duties of strict performance. 
But this seems over-demanding as an account of interpersonal duties between 
sharers, given that it is legitimate for both individuals who share an intention to 
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agree not to perform an intended action.9 The shared intention account of duties 
between parents is however able to resolve this apparent paradox. Duties of shared 
parenting are constituted by a distinctive combination of the importance of 
assurance in agreements, the significance of autonomy in deciding one’s goals, and 
the entitlement to choose with whom one shares parenting. Duties of shared 
parenting are stringent, but not duties of strict performance. 
3.2 The Values of Assurance and Autonomy in Duties of Shared Parenting 
When we come to rely on each other through forming a shared intention, our central 
interest is in sharing. Compensation may be required to remedy loss caused by 
failure of sharing. But our interest in compensation is not simply equivalent to our 
interest in performing the action in a shared manner. Scanlon describes this interest 
in the performance of action that one has come to rely on as derived from the value 
of assurance (Scanlon 2003, p.243). Assurance is of value because it provides the 
psychological benefits of peace-of-mind about plans for the future, but also because 
one has an interest in that which is agreed actually coming about. The value of 
assurance pervades many kinds of agreements, such as promises and contracts 
where we have an interest not only in being compensated for loss, but also in the 
fulfilment of that on which we rely. The value of assurance applies also therefore to 
shared intentions, at least those where sharers rely on sharing. Scanlon describes this 
as the Principle of Fidelity, summing up duties of assurance where we have a primary 
                                              
9
 For a defence of the view that duties of sharing require strict performance see (Gilbert 1993) 
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interest in the performance of that to which we have agreed (Principle F*) (Scanlon 
2003, p.245). 10  
When applied to the special nature of shared parenting, the value of 
assurance in agreements begins to resolve the invidious choice. The value of 
assurance explains why Andy cannot unilaterally relinquish his duties merely by 
providing material compensation. Belle’s decision to adopt the role of parent was 
based in part on Andy’s assurance that this would be a shared task. Thus Belle has an 
interest in Andy sharing parenting. Andy’s failure to share creates both pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary loss for Belle, and he has a duty to provide compensation for both. 
Andy may compensate Belle fully for the material loss of his withdrawal of sharing by 
ensuring that Belle is in as good a position materially as she was before. But to offer 
Belle material compensation for his failure to share is not simply to make good a 
material loss, it is to attempt to replace Belle’s interest in sharing with an alternative 
interest: single parenting adequately compensated. But Belle is entitled to choose her 
own ends autonomously. Thus the value of assurance combined with the value of 
autonomy in deciding one’s ends explain why Andy is not entitled to unilaterally 
rescind his agreement to share parenting. By deciding independently to substitute 
material compensation for his contribution to sharing, Andy violates Belle’s 
entitlement to autonomy in deciding her own ends. This is similar to what Robert 
Goodin describes as the wrong of ‘…forced intrapersonal redistributions between a 
                                              
10
 Adjusted following Alonso to include assumptions as well as expectations. 
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person’s plans and projects’ (Goodin 1989, p.69). So the wrong that Andy performs in 
withdrawing his sharing is not simply creating a material and non-material loss for 
which he is obliged to provide compensation. Andy also wrongs Belle by preventing 
her from pursuing her goal of shared parenting and attempting to substitute it with a 
different goal against her wishes: sufficiently resourced single parenting. Thus the 
combination of the importance of autonomously choosing one’s ends and the value 
of assurance of an agreement being fulfilled explain why Andy is under a duty to 
continue sharing. Andy has a stringent duty to fulfil his duties as sharer, in spite of his 
offer of compensation to Belle. 
3.3 The Value of Intimacy in Duties of Shared Parenting 
Andy may recognise that he has a duty to fulfil Belle’s expectations that parenting be 
shared, and that it is impermissible to attempt to alter that goal unilaterally. He may 
therefore try to replace his contribution to sharing with another sharer: perhaps his 
parents who retain a good relationship with Belle and who similarly value shared 
parenting; or he may offer to pay for a live-in nanny. This may seem sufficient to fulfil 
Andy’s duty. It leaves Belle as well off as she was before Andy rescinded on their 
agreement, and ensures that Belle fulfils her interest in sharing. This avoids the 
morally impermissible attempt to replace Belle’s interest in sharing with a different 
interest: sufficiently resourced single parenting. However, Belle may not only have an 
interest in there being a sharer, but also an interest in that sharer being Andy. The 
special features of shared parenting provide Belle with strong entitlements to decide 
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whether to accept or reject such an offer of replacement sharing. This establishes the 
stringency of Belle’s claim that Andy cannot relinquish his duty unilaterally whilst 
avoiding notions of strict performance.  
There may be relationships of sharing where unilaterally rescinding on the 
agreement to share and providing a replacement sharer discharges the duty of the 
person who rescinds. For example, David may form a shared intention with Andy to 
help Andy move out of the home he shares with Belle. David may subsequently 
decide he cannot help, but ensure his brother Evan helps instead. Thus David has 
unilaterally withdrawn from the agreement to share in the house move with Andy. 
But Andy is not entitled to require David to keep to his agreement to share in 
moving, as David has ensured that Evan will fulfil the duty of sharing instead. Thus 
the general structure of interpersonal duties of shared intentions accounts for both 
the special responsibilities between Andy and David as sharers, and for the 
voluntariness of relinquishing responsibilities of sharing. It explains the stringency of 
the duty to ensure that there is a sharer, whilst avoiding a duty of strict performance 
on David.  
But the duties of shared parenting are more stringent than the duties of shared 
house moving because of the special features of parenting. Andy is not entitled to 
insist that it is David who shares in house moving, but Belle is entitled to insist that 
Andy share parenting. Belle has a strong entitlement to Andy’s sharing, but not a 
strict entitlement, because Belle is also permitted to accept a replacement sharer. 
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Sharing in raising a child is normally an extended and pervasive commitment that 
involves wide ranging and deeply entwined relationships. Shared parenting may of 
course be conducted without great contact and intimacy, and Belle may consider the 
offer of such a replacement sharer as reasonable. But it is also reasonable to reject 
such an offer if the nature of the sharing to which Andy and Belle committed 
involved considerable mutual engagement, personal disclosure, and intimacy. Most 
parent child relationships occur within a domain of privacy and intimacy. As 
parenting often requires this kind of close and intimate relationship it is reasonable 
for Belle to reject to the offer of a replacement sharer with whom to share. Belle is 
permitted to reject this because of her entitlement to choose those with whom she 
has an intimate relationship. 
Belle is entitled to insist that Andy fulfils his agreement to share parenting on 
grounds of the value of assurance in fulfilling agreements, and the importance of 
autonomy in choosing ones ends. Belle is also entitled to reject offers of substitute 
sharers due to the special intimacy involved in shared parenting. The importance of 
autonomy, the value of assurance, and the role of intimacy in parenting resolves the 
invidious choice with which the intentional account of parenthood seemed to be 
faced. It accounts both for the stringency of Belle’s claims against Andy in spite of 
offers of compensation; and it avoids creating duties of strict performance as parties 
may release each other from their obligations if acceptable substitute sharers are 
provided. Thus the intentional account of the normative dimension of parenthood 
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can satisfactorily explain both the existence and the stringency of the duties of 
shared parenting.  
Conclusion  
Deciding to share in parenting a child creates special duties between adults: duties 
toward the child as parent; and duties towards each other as sharers. The intentional 
account of parental duties appears unable to explain the stringency of duties of 
shared parenting. It appears to permit a parent to unilaterally withdraw from shared 
parenting provided they compensate the other parent adequately. However, it seems 
reasonable for a parent who has come to rely on their partner to share in parenting 
to demand not simply compensation, but continued sharing. Despite appearances, 
the intentional account of parental duties is able to explain the stringency of duties 
of shared parenting. This explanation is provided by recognising the distinctive 
duties that are created when persons form shared intentions. Shared intentions, 
whilst not intrinsically normative, constitute relationships of reliance between sharers. 
Relationships of reliance are of normative significance because individuals who share 
intentions form expectations about each other’s beliefs and actions in the future. 
Certain duties of sharing may be relinquished by one party unilaterally if sufficient 
compensation is provided for loss due to unfulfilled expectations, or if a replacement 
sharer is provided. But duties of shared parenting are not so easily extinguished. 
When individuals agree to share, their goal is to share. If one sharer unilaterally 
withdraws from sharing and attempts to substitute financial compensation for 
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sharing, then they have forced the other sharer to substitute sharing for money. This 
violates the value of autonomy of individuals to choose their own ends. Those who 
share parenting are also not entitled to unilaterally relinquish their duty to share if 
they provide alternative sharers, such as grandparents or nannies. This is due to the 
special features of shared parenting. Parenting is a particularly extended, pervasive, 
and profound commitment that often involves intimacy between parents. Individuals 
are entitled to decide with whom they share such an intimate act as parenting a 
child. They may though accept such offers of replacement sharers and release the 
other from their duties. Thus duties of shared parenting are stringent but not duties 
of strict performance. Duties of shared parenting persist even if one party wishes to 
share no longer; duties of shared parenting persist until both parties agree they are 
dissolved. The shared intention account of duties between parents is therefore able 
to retain the intentionalist concern for voluntarism as the basis for special 
obligations, whilst explaining the stringency of duties of shared parenting.   
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